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The Beating of Rasic’s Son and ‘Discipline of National Back’

The beating of Nenad Rasic’s son was not an excess of a group of young people, it was a logical flow of a policy that determines the “purity” of Serbs.

1. I saw the recording of the beating of Nikola Rasic, Nenad’s son. A crowd of twenty or more people beat an 18-year-old in the yard of the Laplasella High School, no one intervened to stop this brutality, while encouraging cries were heard to unite other young people in this beating, in the name of Kosovo of Metohija and the Diocese of Raska and Metohija (of the Serbian Orthodox Church)”.

“Father Sava of the Monastery of Deçan, that is, of this diocese, wrote a day later that “the child was beaten with iron rods, boxers, his teeth were broken, his face was massacred, all in the sunlight in front of a crowd of people from whom no who helped them, a cruelty and shame … These people were not Serbs, but non-people ”.

And, with an invitation for insight, Sava Janjic asks: “When will the wrongdoers stop calling in the name of Serbia and religions with which they have nothing in common?”.

I fear that the answer is more complicated and starts with “not soon” and for a simple reason: the beating of Nikola Rasic, Nenad’s son, was no exception, an adventure of high school-age hooligans venting their aggression against someone who is different from them.

The beating was a rule and a logical consequence of a multi-year political action that tries to bring the Serbian public sphere in Kosovo under operational control and mentality.

Nikola’s father, Nenad, is a Kosovo Serb politician who is not part of the Serb List in Kosovo. For years, especially in the parliamentary elections, the pressure was exerted that the votes of Kosovo Serb citizens go only to the Serbian List.

This pressure is said to have been initially exerted by secret means of Serbian state and military security and ordinary criminals, as well as those who are part of organized crime. But, for some time now, there has been no need for such covert or semi-covert actions – now official Belgrade is ordering, as was done in this election, that only the “Serbian List” protects Serbs and that people like Rasic or Rada Trajkovic are ” Serbs of Albanians ”.

Nikola Rashiq was beaten, consequently, because he was perceived by a majority of young people his age, who watch Belgrade messages on TV every night, to be “Albanian Serb” and not “Serb Serb”, not “exactly Serb”.

2.

So, if an expression of Serbia of the 70s and 80s can be used, the discipline of the back was practiced in Laplasella. In the 70s and 80s the use of rubber stick by the then militia against the citizens was called “discipline of the back”, a metaphor of the urban vocabulary for the operation of a repressive system.

Now, in the third decade of the 21st century, the role of the militia was taken over by the crowd of high school students: with metal rods, iron boxes and hammers they undertook the exercise of “discipline of the back” of Nenad Rasic’s son and Nenad himself.

“This form of discipline of the “national back” is new, as an earlier form, the execution with a bullet in the head, did not show enough results. On January 16, 2014, Dimitrije Janicijevic, an activist of the Serbian Liberal Party (SLS) and a candidate for mayor of that municipality, was shot dead in northern Mitrovica.”

Four years later, on the same day, January 16, Oliver Ivanovic was assassinated, the one who had the capacity to be the most respected figure among Kosovo Serbs and independent of the Serb List. To date, there is no one convicted of these murders, and the aura of the Serbian List has been raised over this guilt.

“Discipline of the national back” from the private threats of the Serbian secret police to the public ones of the official political and media discourse of Belgrade turned into bullets against political opponents and now in beating their children.

The methods may change, but the ideology is one: there is a center in Belgrade, which will represent everything Serbian, and this center will also serve as a “Serbometer”. Morning and evening, on the regime’s nearby televisions, the names of people in Kosovo who are not “enough Serbs” will be shown. From here to intimidation and violence it doesn’t take much imagination.

3.

The case of Nikola Rasic opened the window for identity and political friction within the Serb community.

“Discipline of the back” to define the purity of “Serbism” is nothing but a form of totalitarianism (names can be freely found that explain what its form is). Such a thing is not that it does not happen to Albanians: throughout the last century, an ideological war has been waged to determine which is the center that defines who is more Albanian than the other.

In fact, such a war is still going on today, again to determine who is more “national”, at the same time placing it on portals, parties or groups of authors for “Albanian meter”. But the difference is substantial, even so substantial that in the small Kosovo two parallel political processes took place.

A regular democratic electoral process took place among the Albanians, which in the best civil peace produced an electoral revolution with the overthrow of the current ruling elites. There was a “discipline of the backc” intervention among Kosovo Serbs, where all citizens of this nationality were supposed to declare their national purity by voting for the Serbian List. And, not only that: in the Serbian environments and with a directed vote, the selection of the “purity” of Bosniaks and Roma was made.

Those candidates who are close to the Serbian List received clean votes. This now opens a new chapter that is still the topic of theoretical debate: how to define identity, ie the relationship between identity and political power?

The debate is not abstract: the Constitution of Kosovo creates space for identity representation, but what if, as in the case of the Serbian List, identity space becomes a unit of “national discipline” or of determining who can be accepted as a Bosniak or a Roma?

This debate, which is not abstract, is about something called constitutional deformation and that has major consequences for the country’s constitutional system. For example, by electronic voting in the upcoming parliamentary elections, Albanians can determine who can be a Serb, or a Serb acceptable to Albanians. This raises questions, ie that some principles of positive discrimination in the constitutional system of the country have now been questioned.

4.

The friction of two political movements – one democratic among Albanians and one authoritarian among Serbs – does not seem to appear as a problem for the new government. This, however, is not new: in a moment of a coincidence that may or may not be accidental, ten years ago in Kosovo, the votes among Albanians were stolen in an industrial form, the EU insisted that with stolen votes or not to form the Government that the dialogue with Serbia would start, the Council of Europe approved the report of Dick Marty, while Belgrade formed the Serbian List.

Now, in anticipation of a new government that is not blackmailed with the compliance of the past decade, including with Serbian organized crime, the signs of “disicpline of the back” tried to give a message of strength./albaniandailynews.

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